"Other researchers have called attention to the different incentives for academic performance that exist in various countries. Bishop (1987; 1989), for example, notes the lack of relevance that grades and transcripts have for job placement and enrollment in post-secondary education in the United States, while Rosenbaum and Kiraya (1989) describe the tight institutional linkages between Japanese business firms and schools. In both analyses, it is argued that U.S. schools could secure greater student engagement and higher academic performance by tightening inter-institutional linkages between schools, businesses, and post-secondary institutions. Such linkages would clarify the relationship between student performance in school and future success, and could encourage more explicit monitoring of school achievement by businesses and postsecondary institutions."
"In fact, there is some evidence to support this view. Using data from the Second International Mathematics Study (SIMS), Bishop (1997) reports that, after controlling for a variety of relevant variables, average student achievement on the SIMS mathematics tests is higher in countries where curriculum-based examinations determine access to further education than in countries that lack such tests."(p.378)
[JC notes: Bishop (1997) used data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 1994-5 & International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) 1991 studies]
Bishop, J. (1987). Information externalities and the social payoff to academic achievement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Center for Advanced Human Resource: Studies.
Bishop. J. (1989). Incentives for learning: Why American high school students compare so poorly to their counterparts overseas. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
Bishop, J. (1997). The effect of national standards and curriculum-based exams on student achievement. American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings, (May), pp. 260-264.